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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2015, the state of New York seized Jerry Campbell’s four-story brick 
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home in Brooklyn, New York.1 The home belonged to Mr. Campbell’s family for 
sixty years starting with his grandfather.2 After his grandfather’s passing, Mr. 
Campbell came into possession of the home and he and his wife hoped to raise 
their son in it.3 Instead, Campbell’s decade-long battle with the state and Forest 
City Ratner (FCR), a private development company, culminated in the state 
taking the home and razing it to the ground.4 
The state coveted Mr. Campbell’s home for constructing the Atlantic Yard 
project, a private development plan that built the Barclays Center: an arena for 
the NBA’s Brooklyn Nets and NHL’s New York Islanders.5 After negotiations 
over compensation between Mr. Campbell and the state stalled, the state 
responded by taking the home through eminent domain.6 
Eminent domain allows federal, state, and local governments to take private 
property for public use as long as the government pays the landowner “just 
compensation.”7 Countless cities have employed eminent domain to build sports 
and entertainment venues;8 including, but not limited to, Brooklyn (Barclays 
Center),9 Sacramento (The Golden 1 Center),10 Atlanta (SunTrust Park)11, Dallas 
(Globe Life Park)12, Los Angeles (Dodgers Stadium)13, and Washington D.C. 
(Nationals Park).14 
This Comment maintains that using fair market value to meet the “just 
 
1.  Michael O’Keefe, No Place Like Home: Atlantic Yards Project has Jerry Campbell Fighting for his 
Place in Brooklyn, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/atlantic-
yards-project-brooklyn-family-fighting-home-article-1.2598611 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).  
2.  Id.  
3.  Id.  
4.  Id.  
5.  Id.  
6.  Id.  
7.  U.S. CONST. amend V; U.S. Const. amend XIV.  
8.  Ryan Lillis, Sacramento Kings will Pay $12 Million for Former Macy’s Property under Court 
Settlement, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/city-
beat/article9711272.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Ilya Somin, The Bush Family 
and Eminent Domain, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/02/08/the-bush-family-and-eminent-domain/?utm_term=.7829afddedb5 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); Evann Gastaldo, 31 Georgia Residents to Have Homes Demolished for 
Ballpark, NEWSER (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.newser.com/story/234230/31-georgia-residents-to-have-homes-
demolished-for-ballpark.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); David Nakamura, D.C. 
Seizes 16 Owners’ Property for Stadium, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/25/AR2005102501354_pf.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); O’Keefe, supra note 1; Elijah Chiland, The Troubled Past of Dodge Stadium and Chavez Ravine, L.A. 
CURBED (Apr. 3, 2016), https://la.curbed.com/2016/4/3/11358092/dodger-stadium-history-chavez-ravine (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9.  O’Keefe, supra note 1. 
10.  Lillis, supra note 8.  
11.  Gastaldo, supra note 8.  
12.  Somin, supra note 8.  
13.  Chiland, supra note 8.  
14.  Nakamura, supra note 8.  
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compensation” requirement of the Fifth Amendment drastically 
undercompensates property owners.15 Paying “just compensation” purports to 
make former property owners “whole” and the Supreme Court views fair market 
value as achieving this goal.16 Fair market value is what a willing buyer would 
pay for the property at the time of the taking.17 However, fair market value does 
not compensate for sentimental value of the home, gains generated by the new 
development, and other miscellaneous costs such as attorney’s fees, relocation 
costs, and home replacement costs if the price exceeds the fair market value.18 
Therefore, fair market value severely undercompensates property owners and 
ultimately fails to make property owners “whole.”19 
Additionally, this Comment argues that, as a matter of public policy, fair 
market value is not enough to satisfy the “just compensation” element of the 
Fifth Amendment.20 Finally, this Comment proposes that state and local 
governments employing eminent domain to build stadiums should adequately 
compensate property owners by paying the condemned property’s fair market 
value and a share of the stadium’s profits to the property owners.21 
Part II of this Comment examines the seminal case of Kelo v. City of New 
London.22 Part III discusses the economic impact stadiums effectuate on cities 
and provides examples of governments employing eminent domain for sports 
stadiums, unfettered by the potentially harmful economic consequences of 
stadium construction.23 Part IV explores proposed solutions by scholars at 
rectifying fair market value’s inadequacies.24 Part V presents this Comment’s 
proposal – that cities should pay compensation beyond fair market value to 
owners whose property has been taken through eminent domain to construct 
stadiums.25 In particular, this Comment advocates that property owners receive a 
share of the stadium’s profits and their property’s fair market value.26 
II. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND “JUST COMPENSATION” 
Although much of the conversation surrounding eminent domain concerns 
the “public use” requirement, the “just compensation” component equally 
 
15.  U.S. CONST. amend V.  
16.  United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar 
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913). 
17.  564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511. 
18.  JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 690–91 (4th ed. 2017). 
19.  Infra Parts V–VI.  
20.  U.S. CONST. amend V.  
21.  Infra Part VI.  
22.  Infra Part II.   
23.  Infra Part III.  
24.  Infra Part V.  
25.  Infra Part VI.  
26.  Infra Part VI.  
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requires a closer look.27 Section A introduces and discusses the case of Kelo v. 
City of New London.28 Section B examines the “just compensation” requirement 
of eminent domain.29 Section C examines the items not included in “just 
compensation.”30 
A. Kelo v. City of New London 
 The decision in Kelo v. City of New London not only sparked national public 
outrage and protests, but greatly broadened the definition of “public use” and 
furthered a discussion on “just compensation.”31 In 2000, the city of New 
London, Connecticut, an economically depressed city, approved a development 
plan the city projected would revitalize the city by creating more than 1,000 jobs, 
increase tax revenue, and construct new homes, restaurants, hotels, and other 
recreational opportunities.32 Pfizer Inc., a pharmaceutical company, announced it 
would build a new research facility in the city, something that local planners 
hoped would jump-start the city’s revival.33 The city received funds from the 
State but needed the land for the project.34 The city’s development agency bought 
properties from willing sellers and used eminent domain to acquire the remaining 
properties from unwilling owners.35 These unwilling owners sued the city and 
argued that taking their properties violated the “public use” requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment.36 The owners maintained that their properties were not 
“blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only 
because they happen to be located in the development area.”37 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city.38 Justice Stevens wrote that the 
redevelopment plan “unquestionably serves as a public purpose” and the taking 
satisfied the public use requirement.39 Moreover, since economic development 
has been “a traditional and long accepted function of government,” taking private 
property to better an economically depressed area is permissible.40 Justice 
Stevens further wrote that this decision does not prevent States from 
 
27.  See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (discussing “public use”).  
28.  Infra, Section II.C.  
29.  Infra, Section II.D.  
30.  Infra, Section II.E.  
31.  JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 919–921 
(3rd ed. 2015). 
32.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005); SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 688.  
33.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.  
34.  Id. at 472–73.  
35.  Id. at 472.   
36.  Id. at 475. 
37.  Id.  
38.  Id. at 490.  
39. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484; SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 688.  
40.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.  
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implementing restrictions on their own eminent domain laws.41 Justice O’Connor 
disagreed and wrote in her dissent that the Court’s decision “wash[es] out any 
distinction between private and public use of property – and thereby effectively 
to delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”42 
Outrage over Kelo further intensified following Pfizer’s decision to not to 
build the facility in New London.43 As a result, Kelo prompted most states to pass 
legislation that imposed greater restraints on eminent domain.44 Although the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelo focused primarily on the “public use” test, the 
transcript of the oral arguments in Kelo raised questions concerning the 
determination of “just compensation.”45 
B. “Just Compensation” and the Fair Market Value Dilemma 
The Fifth Amendment mandates the government to pay “just compensation” 
when it takes private property.46 The Supreme Court defined “just compensation” 
as the fair market value of the property.47 Fair market value is the amount a 
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.48The purpose of "just compensation" 
is to make the property owner "whole" by putting them in as good a monetary 
position as before the government utilized eminent domain.49 
The Supreme Court in United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land noted the 
limitations of paying just fair market value of the property.50 As Justice Marshall 
wrote, “the Court has acknowledged that such an award does not necessarily 
compensate for all values an owner may derive from his property . . . . [t]hus, we 
have held that fair market value does not include the special value of property to 
the owner arising from its adaptability to his particular use.”51 Fair market value 
does not compensate for the sentimental value of the home, gains the new 
development generates, and other miscellaneous costs such as attorney’s fees, 
relocation costs, and home replacement costs if the price exceeds the fair market 
 
41.  Id. at 489. 
42.  Id. at 494.  
43.  SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 688–89.  
44.  Id.  
45.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–51, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04–
108) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Infra Part II, Section C; Part V.  
46.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
47.  United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913) (“the owner must 
be compensated for what is taken from him; but that is done when he is paid its fair market value for all 
available uses and purposes.”) 
48.  SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 690.  
49.  United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 
690; Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 252 (2007). 
50.  564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.  
51.  Id.  
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value.52 
In addition, the Supreme Court in United States v. 50 Acres of Land further 
acknowledged situations where fair market value is an inadequate payment to 
property owners.53 Concurring in the majorities’ opinion, Justice O’Connor 
wrote: 
[W]hen a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of its 
property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the Just 
Compensation Clause and that a substitute facility must be acquired to continue 
to provide an essential service, limiting compensation to fair market value in my 
view would be manifestly unjust.54 
Even though the purpose of fair market value is to “put the owner of 
condemned property in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not 
been taken,”55 fair market value does not always achieve this goal.56 The oral 
arguments in Kelo v. City of New London highlighted the flaws of the fair market 
value standard.57 During the oral arguments in Kelo, Justice Breyer posed a 
hypothetical to New London’s counsel where a person, who bought a home for 
$50,000 and has lived in it his entire life, is suddenly forced to evict but is given 
$500,000 for the home.58 That person has a $450,000 profit but he must pay 30% 
of this profit in taxes and he must find somewhere to live.59 Justice Breyer 
continued: 
[W]ell, I mean, what’s he supposed to do? He now has probably $350,000 to 
pay for a house. He gets half a house because that’s all he is going to do, all he is 
going to get for that money after he paid the taxes…is there some way of 
assuring that the just compensation actually puts the person in the position he 
would be in if he didn’t sell his house? Or is he inevitably worse off?60 
New London’s counsel admitted that although there were relocation loans 
available to those forced to leave, it did not make the former owners “whole.”61 
Although “just compensation” was not an issue in Kelo v. City of New London, 
the Supreme Court raised it anyways, fueling the debate of how much 
compensation is considered “just.”62 Kelo, United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 
and United States v. 50 Acres of Land illustrate the Supreme Court’s consensus 
that fair market value undercompensates property owners.63 
 
52.  Wyman, supra note 49, at 254–55; SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 691.  
53.  United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 37 (1984).  
54.  Id.  
55.  564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
56.  Infra Part V.  
57.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48–51. 
58.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.  
59.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.  
60.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.  
61.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 49.  
62.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 49.  
63.  See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 37 (1984); See also United States v. 564.54 
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C. Items Not Subject to Compensation 
Subjective premiums on property the government seizes through eminent 
domain do not use the fair market value standard for compensation.64 
“Subjective” premiums imply not only sentimental value but out-of-pocket costs 
of moving (relocation expenses), search of shops and services for new locations, 
and site improvements that assist the owner’s uses but do not increase the fair 
market value.65 Moreover, the cost of replacing the condemned property is not 
compensated.66 Likewise, renters are at risk of harm because leased property 
taken through eminent domain terminates the lease, “rendering the remaining 
portion of the tenant’s lease valueless.”67 Further, property owners cannot share 
in the benefits the new economic development generates “because fair market 
value is calculated before those benefits accrue.”68 
The government wipes out sentimental value, personal attachments to one’s 
home, place of business, or community in favor of fair market value.69 
Additionally, subjective premiums are personal and cannot be transferred.70 
Subjective premiums die with the person.71 
To make matters worse, property owners are not compensated for surpluses 
or gains generated that a market transfer might generate.72 Sometimes, the 
property has a higher value when it is transferred to a private party than the 
government.73 However, if faced with eminent domain, the original property 
owner only receives fair market value for the property.74 The government retains 
the surplus.75 In addition, property owners are also not compensated for the 
autonomy to sell when they desire.76 A property owner may wish to sell later for 
 
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.  
64.  Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 956957956, 963 
(2004).).). 
65. Id. 
66.  Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 
106 (2006).).). 
67.  Id. at 107.  
68.  Id. at 110.  
69.  See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (showing that 
Poletown’s residents lost community premium stemming from the neighborhood after Detroit seized one 
thousand residential properties to build a new General Motors facility); Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 886–87 (2007); Fennell, supra note 64, at 
963.   
70.  Fennell, supra note 64, at 964.  
71.  Id.  
72.  Fennell, supra note 64, at 965; Garnett, supra note 66, at 107.  
73.  Fennell, supra note 64, at 966.  
74.  Id.  
75.  Id.  
76.  Id. at 967.  
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a higher or lower price, but loses this choice through eminent domain.77 
Property owners may also suffer from “dignitary harms,” triggered by the 
loss of security.78 Property owners may feel “unsettled and vulnerable when they 
learn that the government plans to take their property.”79 In line with the loss of 
autonomy, property owners will feel they cannot exclude others from their 
property.80 Unsurprisingly, the government does not compensate for “dignitary 
harms.”81 
Furthermore, under-compensation issues often arise as a result of the 
government’s superior bargaining power in negotiations with property owners.82 
Government abuse of bargaining power often leads to various negative results, 
leaving property owners unfairly disadvantaged.83 
Although the government does not compensate for subjective value and 
community premiums, scholars have suggested that a combination of subjective 
value, community premiums, and political influence may deter governments 
from taking private property and entirely avoiding under-compensation.84 
III. EMINENT DOMAIN AND STADIUM CONSTRUCTIONS 
Governments have used eminent domain to construct stadiums since 1958 
and it continues to be a popular option for governments to lure sports franchises, 
despite overwhelming evidence that stadiums are bad investments.85 Initially, 
stadiums did not receive widespread government support.86Teams used private 
funds to subsidize historically well-known stadiums such as Yankee Stadium, 
Fenway Park, and Wrigley Field.87 After World War II, professional sports 
became a big business and sparked the use of eminent domain to build 
stadiums.88 Dodgers Stadium became “a watershed moment” for using eminent 
 
77.  Id.  
78.  Garnett, supra note 66, at 109.  
79.  Id.  
80.  Id.  
81.  Id.  
82.  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 69, at 887.  
83. Id. (noting “For years, the Minnesota Department of Transportation has taken private land for road 
projects and offered the owners substantially less than the land was worth”).  
84.  See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (showing a 
religious leader leading the protests against eminent domain and having partial success; General Motors offered 
to spend millions to move the pastor’s church); Garnett, supra note 66, at 119.  
85.  See Chiland, supra note 8 (explaining the use of eminent domain to build the Los Angeles Dodgers 
stadium); Alex Garcia, Sports Stadiums are Bad Public Investments. So Why are Cities Still Paying for Them? , 
REASON, (Mar. 17, 2015), https://reason.com/reasontv/2015/03/17/sports-stadiums-are-bad-public-investmen 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
86.  Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or Foul?, 35 ENVTL. L. 
311, 314 (2005) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
87.  Id.  
88.  Id.  
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domain to build stadiums.89 
In 1958, the Brooklyn Dodgers moved to Los Angeles after Brooklyn refused 
to finance a stadium.90 Los Angeles picked Chavez Ravine as the location to 
build a new stadium.91 Chavez Ravine had a history as the home to a Mexican-
American community made up of hundreds of families.92 Years earlier in 1950, 
the city had originally picked Chavez Ravine for a new housing development 
project called Elysian Park Heights.93 The city used its eminent domain power to 
buy out residents of Chavez Ravine, promising the citizens first choice to the new 
housing project.94 The housing project never came into fruition, leaving the 
ravine mostly abandoned.95 In 1957, only 20 families remained on the property 
and in 1958, city voters approved giving the land to the Dodgers.96 Police 
forcibly evicted the remaining residents.97 
Since the construction of Dodgers’ Stadium, cities began searching for 
teams.98 Two cases, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders and Cascott LLC v. City 
of Arlington illustrate how courts in different jurisdictions consistently approve 
government’s use of eminent domain for sports franchises and stadiums.99 
Section A presents Oakland, California’s pursuit in keeping the Raiders in 
Oakland and Section B discusses Arlington, Texas’ attempt at securing land for 
the Cowboys stadium.100 Section C illustrates how stadiums are not good 
investments.101 
A. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders 
Since 1966, the Raiders football team played at the Oakland-Alameda 
County Coliseum in Oakland, California.102 Following three renewals of the 
three-year lease on the stadium, the Raiders decided to end the lease.103 In 1980, 
the Raiders announced their intentions to move to Los Angeles.104 The City of 
Oakland responded and commenced an eminent domain action against the 
 
89.  Id.  
90.  Id.  
91.  Chiland, supra note 8.  
92.  Id.  
93.  Id.  
94.  Id.  
95.  Id.  
96.  Chiland, supra note 8.  
97.  Id.  
98.  Weinberg, supra note 86, at 315.  
99.  Cascott, L.L.C. v. City of Arlington, 278 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. App. 2009); City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60 (1982).  
100.  Infra Sections III.A–B.  
101.  Infra Section III.C.  
102.  Raiders, 32 Cal.3d at 63.  
103.  Id.  
104.  Id.  
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team.105 
The California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the City of Oakland.106 The 
Court approved the City’s use of eminent domain referencing Candlestick Park in 
San Francisco, California and Anaheim Stadium in Anaheim, California.107 As 
Justice Richardson wrote, “both [referring to Candlestick Park and Anaheim 
Stadium] owned and operated by municipalities, further suggest the acceptance 
of the general principles that providing access to recreation to its residents in the 
form of spectator sports is an appropriate function of city government.”108 
Justice Richardson also mentioned and agreed with courts in New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio that eminent domain is a viable option to erect 
stadiums.109 Justice Richardson noted, “a sports stadium is for the recreation of 
the public and is hence for a public purpose; for public projects are not confined 
to providing only the bare bones of municipal life, such as police protection, 
streets, sewers, light, and water; they may provide gardens, parks, monuments, 
fountains, libraries, [and] museums …. ”110 Therefore, the California Supreme 
Court held that if a city proves a sports franchise to be a valid public use, the city 
may use eminent domain on property “necessary to accomplish that use.”111 
B. Cascott LLC v. City of Arlington 
In 2004, the Dallas Cowboys negotiated a “Master Agreement” with the City 
of Arlington, Texas to build a new stadium complex in Arlington.112 The “Master 
Agreement” included a lease that outlined the terms of the Cowboy’s use of the 
stadium.113 The City and the Cowboys identified the location for the project and 
the City Council passed a resolution allowing City representatives to purchase 
property within this location.114 However, some property owners could not reach 
an agreement with the City.115 Consequently, the City initiated condemnation 
proceedings against those property owners.116 
The property owners argued that the stadium was not for a public purpose 
because the Cowboys’ lease granted them “exclusive use and rights to manage 
and control the condemned property for … at least thirty (30) years.”117 The court 
 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 72.  
107.  Id. at 71.  
108.  Id.  
109.  Id.  
110.  Id. (citing Martin v. Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 (1966)).   
111.  Id. at 72.  
112.  Cascott, L.L.C. v. City of Arlington, 278 S.W.3d 525, 525 (Tex. App. 2009). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id.  
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. at 529. 
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conceded that the Cowboys would “reap substantial benefits from the project, 
including the Lease,” but a private benefactor does not solely change the purpose 
of taking the property.118 The court held in favor of the City because the 
Cowboys’ lease the public purpose of the stadium project.119 
C. Impact of Stadiums on Local Economies 
The most prominent argument proponents use to validate building a new 
stadium for professional sports teams is that the stadium will boost the local 
economy.120 Proponents often claim that stadiums will produce economic 
revenue and jobs for the city.121 However, these “promises are rarely realized.”122 
Stadiums are bad public investments because most jobs stadiums create only 
produce “temporary, low-paying, or out-of-state contracting jobs–none of which 
contribute greatly to the local economy.”123 In addition, stadium costs often 
exceed estimated amounts as maintenance costs, municipal services, and capital 
improvements cause the city’s total investment to skyrocket.124 
Modern stadiums cost over $1 billion to construct.125 For example, Los 
Angeles Stadium, the new home of the Los Angeles Rams and Chargers football 
teams, will cost $2.66 billion to build.126 The Mercedes Benz Stadium in Atlanta, 
Georgia cost $1.6 billion and the Las Vegas Raiders Stadium will cost an 
estimated $2.4 billion to construct.127 Out of the ten most expensive stadiums 
built, seven are for NFL franchises.128 Football stadiums tend to provide the least 
economic benefit, as they are used so infrequently.129 Football stadiums only host 
two preseason games, eight regular season games, and if they are fortunate, a few 
playoff games.130 Thus, stadiums must be constructed for multi-purpose use to 
host other events like concerts, college football games, soccer games, and hockey 
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games to generate economic benefit.131 
Although stadiums receive private and public funding, the public bears most 
of the costs.132 Taxpayer money primarily funds stadium construction. Moreover, 
the public provides the location and, most significantly, absorbs any debts from 
financing the stadium.133 Oakland, California and St. Louis, Missouri are still 
making substantial annual payments on the debts incurred by the “now-obsolete 
stadiums that were built to lure the Oakland Raiders and St. Louis Rams away 
from Los Angeles in the 1990s.”134 The Cities’ residents are still paying for a 
stadium that no team plays in.135 
City governments continue using eminent domain to obtain land for stadium 
constructions, betting on economic prosperity.136 The following are two 
contrasting effects stadium construction can have over Cities.137 Part 1 discusses 
the Barclays Center and the negative effects a City typically encounters, whereas 
Part 2 examines a rare case in the Golden 1 Center which has tentatively 
produced economic growth.138 
1. The Barclays Center 
The Barclays Center is a key example of the problems stadium construction 
can have on a community.139 Organizers promised affordable housing, but it has 
not yet materialized.140 Current constructions of affordable housing face 
structural and engineering problems.141 While the businesses surrounding the 
Barclays Center profited due to their existence prior to the arena’s construction—
mainly because of the rising popularity of the area—the arena itself lost $9 
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million in its third year of operation.142 Additionally, operating expenses of the 
Barclays Center remain high, but the arena’s net operation income fell behind 
expectations.143 
2. The Golden 1 Center 
The Golden 1 Center in Sacramento, California produced the opposite effect 
of the Barclays Center.144 The Golden 1 Center replaced a nearly empty shopping 
mall in downtown Sacramento.145 The stadium’s construction spurred a 38% 
increase in jobs in the downtown region, and twenty-seven stores opened in 
2017, with twenty-three more scheduled to open in 2018.146 Additionally, the vast 
amount of construction caused the city to “hire two dozen new employees to 
process applications and building permits.”147 
As the Golden 1 Center illustrates, employing eminent domain to build a 
sports stadium may have positive effects on the local economy.148 However, in 
most cases, stadiums do not produce this anticipated economic growth.149 Yet, 
local government officials continue to recklessly push for eminent domain to 
build stadiums.150 One way to curtail government’s use of eminent domain to 
build stadiums is the “just compensation” element.151 To counter the rash 
decision-making of government, property owners who suffer from an eminent 
domain taking should receive higher compensation.152 
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS TO “JUST COMPENSATION” 
Scholars generally agree that fair market value is “practically a euphemism, 
in the sense that it generally does not fairly compensate landowners.”153 As a 
result, many scholars proposed alternative measures to calculate “just 
compensation,” eschewing fair market value.154 One proposal involves 
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incorporating the “publicly-expressed expected benefits of the project” into 
compensation by modifying “just compensation” to reflect the current value by 
including economic development of the condemned land to the amount of 
compensation.155 Another proposal recommends awarding 150% of the fair 
market value to former property owners when there are “suspect” conditions in 
the eminent domain process, i.e., high subjective value.156 
Section A discusses Professor Katrina Wyman’s objective approach to 
takings compensation.157 Section B explores Professors Amnon Lehavi and Amir 
Licht’s special-purpose development corporation approach.158 Section C analyzes 
Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky’s self-assessment 
proposition.159 
A. Objective Measure to Takings Compensation 
Professor Wyman’s approach to takings compensation employs an objective 
metric for determining “just compensation.”160 Under an objective metric, people 
are made “whole” by receiving items that are broadly accepted by society as 
items that make people “whole.”161 Professor Wyman acknowledged that 
applying an objective measure to takings compensation is difficult because “there 
are many different conceptions of what is important in life.”162 However, an 
objective measure to takings compensation fits the Supreme Court’s desire to put 
“the owner of condemned property in as good a position pecuniarily as if his 
property had not been taken,” better than fair market value can.163 Furthermore, 
an objective approach avoids the problems that a subjective measure 
encounters.164 Professor Wyman’s proposal relies on two possible bases; an 
objective list theory of “well-being” and a capabilities theory.165 
The objective list theory does not define “well-being” as fulfilling individual 
preferences but lists what goods are “worth having.”166 Thus, an objective list 
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theory of “well-being” may measure takings compensation as the amount 
necessary to enable former property owners “to enjoy the goods on the list of 
desirable things, at the same level that they enjoyed these goods before the 
taking.”167 Under a capability theory, compensation for takings is measured by 
“the amount required to ensure that former property owners enjoy the same 
capabilities that we as a society deem valuable, before and after the taking.”168 
Following the identification of what it means to make a person “whole” by 
applying either theories, Professor Wyman presents three ways of calculating 
compensation: (1) a single standard payment that all former property owners 
receive for the taking of their property, (2) compensation based on schedules 
(categorizations) created by legislation or regulation, or (3) case-by-case 
determinations (which is the preferred method).169 
Professor Wyman acknowledges that her proposal encounters problems.170 
For example, implementing a case-by-case objective approach to measuring 
compensation will increase litigation, as a list of what is considered valuable to 
society will likely be too general and necessitate court intervention and 
interpretation.171 In addition, her proposal rests on a lofty assumption that society 
can agree on a list enumerating what everyone believes is necessary.172 
Although Professor Wyman’s objective approach may adequately 
compensate takings for traditional public uses, e.g., parks, freeways, etc., it does 
not necessarily work for takings related to private, for-profit business 
enterprises.173 Professor Wyman’s proposal relies on either the objective list 
theory or the capabilities theory to produce a list detailing what items society 
deems should be compensable.174 Using the land for traditional public purposes 
would result in generic items society would deem to be compensable for the 
taking, like housing and possibly sentimental value.175 Since the land is being 
used for the public, it wouldn’t necessarily garner strong reactions, given that 
everyone in the public can use the land.176 However, once society learns that the 
land will be used for a profit-making enterprise that isn’t necessarily open to the 
general public, what constitutes as valuable to society becomes difficult to 
pinpoint.177 The side that opposes stadium construction may demand more 
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compensation and more things to compensate, while the side that supports 
stadium construction will demand less compensation and less items to 
compensate.178 Both sides—who are a part of the same society—must receive 
consideration, resulting in a standstill.179 Ultimately, a general list cannot be 
formed under either theory.180 
B. The Special-Purpose Development Corporation (SPDC) 
Professors Lehavi and Licht base their proposal on “a corporate finance 
perspective.”181 They argue that the two phases of eminent domain–taking and 
“just compensation”–should be separated.182 They characterize a taking as 
resembling an incorporation of a firm.183 Compensation is viewed as “market 
driven” and be given through “a special-purpose corporation whose securities 
would be offered to condemnees (former property owners whose land was taken 
by the use of eminent domain).”184 Ultimately, Lehavi and Licht believed their 
approach limits opportunistic landowners and private developers from taking 
advantage of eminent domain.185 
Lehavi and Licht propose that a public authority, typically a municipal 
agency employing eminent domain, create a special-purpose development 
corporation (SPDC).186 The SPDC may be established as a subsidiary of the 
municipality and be delegated powers by the municipality.187 The municipality 
may exercise eminent domain to take private property and then grant certain 
rights to the land to the SPDC.188 Property owners, who have had their lands 
condemned, are presented two compensation options: (1) “just compensation” 
based on pre-project fair market value; or (2) securities in the SPDC “in 
proportion to the landowner’s contribution.”189 The SPDC would have “several–
possibly numerous–shareholders.”190 The SPDC would negotiate with the private 
developers who began the project or auction the land off.191 After selling the 
land, the SPDC would distribute the net proceeds from the sale as dividends to 
the shareholders.192 The SPDC dissolves when it finishes its duties.193 
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Professors Lehavi and Licht’s proposal doesn’t necessarily change or stray 
from fair market value as the standard measure of “just compensation.”194 The 
SPDC’s negotiations may fail and lead to property owners receiving only the fair 
market value for their property or nothing if the private developers no longer 
want the land in question.195 Additionally, questions of impartiality of the SPDC 
remain because local governments provide the SPDC with power.196 
Governmental interest in developing a stadium may push the SPDC to negotiate 
quickly and in a manner favorable to the developers.197 Furthermore, Lehavi and 
Licht’s proposal does not compensate for potential post-project fair market 
value.198 Land becomes more valuable if businesses are placed on it.199 Former 
property owners should receive compensation when their land transforms into 
something profitable.200 Thus, Lehavi and Licht’s proposal would not necessarily 
be beneficial for altering compensation for property owners that lose their land to 
stadium construction.201 
C. Self-Assessment Method and Economic Development Theory 
Professors Bell and Parchomovsky contend that fully compensating 
landowners requires knowledge of the value owners attach to their property.202 
However, relying on the landowner’s testimony about the value they place on 
their property is generally not advised because landowners typically exaggerate 
their compensation awards.203 Thus, fair market value typically disregards 
subjective value, although it is required to fully compensate landowners.204 To 
solve this dilemma, Bell and Parchomovsky advocate a self-reporting system-
similar to filing taxes-to attach a value to the landowner’s property.205 Bell and 
Parchomovsky admit the problem is over-reporting, rather than under-
reporting.206 
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  Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal appear in three phases.207 The first is 
that the government will show its intent to condemn a certain lot or set of lots.208 
Once the government’s declaration has been made, the landowners report the 
value she attaches to the property.209 After the government receives the report, it 
can either seize the property or decide not to.210 Following the government’s 
decision, if the government declines to take the property, the government will 
impose two restrictions on them.211 First, the landowner cannot transfer the 
property for less than the self-reported value, or a partial inalienability 
restraint.212 Second, the landowner’s property tax liability will be based on the 
self-reported valuation.213 
The partial inability restraint remains in force for the life of the owner and 
can be overcome by paying a redemption fee to the government for transferring 
the property beyond the self-reported value.214 If a landowner wants to transfer 
property less than the self-reported value, she can pay the government a fee 
“equal to the difference between the sale price and the self-reported value.”215 
Concerning the tax restraint, the property tax assessor must keep track of the 
government-assessed value, and the self-reported value.216 The government-
assessed value will be used for regular property tax bill purposes and the self-
reported value will only come into effect when the government decides to 
condemn the property.217 Bell and Parchomovsky maintain that the tax 
landowners pay will be on the difference between self-reported value and market 
value, and further discounted by the ratio between government assessed value 
and market value.218 Both of the inalienability and tax restraints must be adjusted 
yearly to reflect inflation and fluctuations in the real estate market.219 
Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal is not without flaws, as objections to their 
proposal include abuses by the government and the landowners.220 Governments 
might abuse the self-reporting system by declaring its use of eminent domain on 
a piece of property without actually intending to take the land.221 The 
government’s declaration will prompt property owners to report their value on 
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the property.222 Most property owners will attach a high valuation for their 
property and their property tax liability will reflect this self-reported valuation.223 
Consequently, the government enjoys benefits from increased tax revenue, as 
property owners’ property taxes will be based on a higher self-reported land 
valuation than it did before the government’s eminent domain proclamation. 224 
This empty threat may affect elderly landowners greatly because they are more 
motivated to overstate their property’s value as they have no realistic expectation 
of a sale while they are living.225 However, Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal 
would guarantee elderly landowners full compensation at their subjective value if 
there were a taking, eliminating any motivation to hold out.226 
Furthermore, changed circumstances may hamper their proposal by altering 
the subjective value landowners attach to their property.227 Bell and 
Parchomovsky can only assume that landowners will anticipate changed 
circumstances when they self-report their property’s value, but that appears to be 
unrealistic.228 
V. PROPOSAL: SALES AND PROPERTY TAX APPROACH 
Despite its inadequacies, fair market value remains the controlling standard 
for measuring “just compensation.”229 This Comment’s proposal reinforces and 
fills in the deficiencies left by the fair market value standard by fully 
compensating property owners and leaving them “subjectively indifferent to 
whether [the taking] … took place or not.”230 This Comment argues that when the 
government takes privately-owned land using eminent domain to construct 
stadiums, the government should pay the former land owners the fair market 
value of their property and a share to the profits generated by the stadium. 231 
This proposal generates two policy outcomes: first, that fair market value 
simply undercompensates property owners and second, changes to “just 
compensation” will “have the effect of requiring local officials to pay more for 
the land, which should restrict their willingness to make highly speculative uses 
of eminent domain.”232 
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This proposal begins with a process identical to other eminent domain 
proceedings; the property owners will be approached by local government 
officials and told that their land will be condemned (taken) to build a stadium. 233 
The local government will condemn the property and pay the property owners the 
fair market value of the property.234 
Subsequently, the government negotiates or informs stadium or sports team 
officials that they will be levying a sales and property tax on the stadium.235 
Local governments may implement a local property tax of 2.44%, based on New 
Jersey’s property tax rates, and a sales tax of 7.25%, based on California’s basic 
statewide sales and use tax.236 The sales tax could be imposed on concession 
items and other goods sold at the stadium such as jerseys, memorabilia, hats, 
food, drinks, etc.237 The local government can collect this tax and distribute it to 
the property owners for a number of years.238 The number of years will equal the 
length of time the property owners lived in or possessed the property.239 If the 
property owner passes away, the government’s tax distribution will be given to 
the property owner’s spouse or children for the remaining years the property 
owner was to be paid.240 For example, if the property owner passed away after 
receiving tax distributions for 15 of the 30 years that he or she owned the 
property, his or her spouse or children will receive 15 years of tax 
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distributions.241 If the property owner possessed the property but never lived in it, 
i.e., land for business, the years he or she receives tax distributions will be 
determined by the years he or she owned the land.242 If the land was in the 
property owner’s family’s possession for many generations, the years would be 
equivalent to the years the family owned the property up to two generations.243 
This proposal provides former property owners an immediate payout for their 
land, and future payments to leave them “subjectively indifferent to whether [the 
taking] … took place or not.”244 An issue with this proposal is that a property 
owner may receive distributions for an extended period of time, especially if the 
land was owned for many generations.245 Furthermore, this proposal rests on the 
assumption that a statute has been passed, or a Supreme Court decision has been 
rendered, rejecting fair market value as the sole measure of “just 
compensation.”246 State and local governments would only negotiate with 
stadium officials if they were compelled by the possibility of lawsuits by 
property owners arguing for higher compensation.247 Accordingly, a statute or 
case dismissing fair market value leaves state and local governments with a 
decision to make: lose out on the construction of a stadium or pay property 
owners more than the fair market value of the property.248 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The oral arguments in Kelo v. City of New London indicate that “just 
compensation” remains an issue that needs to be explored.249 Although fair 
market value remains the standard for defining “just compensation” it should be 
supplemented to avoid under-compensation of property owners.250 Cities approve 
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stadium constructions for altruistic purposes and some stadiums have produced 
positive results.251 However, most stadium constructions fall short of their 
intended goal of boosting the local economy.252 Imposing higher compensation 
standards will not only avoid under-compensation to property owners, but could 
curtail sports teams and government officials from indiscriminately employing 
eminent domain.253 The hope is that governments will proceed cautiously when 
considering using eminent domain.254 
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